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Abstract. We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player
mean-payoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution
concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria. Recall that a
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his pay-
off by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and
leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player—called the leader—who
can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A
strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the
leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and
a leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return
for the leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can
additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts
of her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers pro-
vides the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we
show that this can indeed improve the leader’s payoff in such games. The
key fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equi-
libria in mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem
related to constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive
note, we show that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity
of the problem falls in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games.
We present an implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss
experimental results that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis.
1 Introduction
The classical mean-payoff games [30,7] are two-player zero-sum games that are
played on weighted finite graphs, where two players—Max and Min—take turn
to move a token along the edges of the graph to jointly construct an infinite
play. The objectives of the players Max and Min are to respectively maximise
and minimise the limit average reward associated with the play. Mean-payoff
games enjoy a special status in verification, since µ-calculus model checking and
parity games can be reduced in polynomial-time to solving mean-payoff games.
Mean-payoff objectives can also be considered as quantitative extensions [15,13]
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of classical Bu¨chi objectives, where we are interested in the limit-average share
of occurrences of accepting states rather than merely in whether or not infinitely
many accepting states occur. For a broader discussion on quantitative verifica-
tion, in general, and the transition from the classical qualitative to the modern
quantitative interpretation of deterministic Bu¨chi automata, we refer the reader
to Henzinger’s survey on quantiative reactive modelling and verification [15].
We focus on multi-player extension of mean-payoff games where a finite num-
ber of players control various vertices and move a token along the edges to col-
lectively produce an infinite run. There is a player-specific reward function that,
for every edge of the graph, gives an immediate reward to each player. The pay-
off to a player associated with a play is the limit average of the rewards in the
individual moves. The most natural question related to the multi-player game
setting is to find an optimal ‘stable’ strategy profile (a set of strategies, one for
each player). Broadly speaking, a strategy profile is stable, if no player has an
incentive to deviate from it. Nash equilibria [19] and leader equilibria [29,13]
(also known as Stackelberg equilibria) are the most common notions of stable
strategy profiles for multi-player games.
A strategy profile is called a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his
payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. In a setting where we have a dis-
tinguished player (called the leader) who is able to suggest a strategy profile to
other players (called followers), a strategy profile is stable if no follower can im-
prove his payoff by unilaterally deviating from the profile. A leader equilibrium
is a stable strategy profile that maximises the reward for the leader.
In this paper, we introduce and study a novel notion of stable strategy profiles
for multi-player mean-payoff games that we call incentive Stackelberg equilibria
(or incentive equilibria for short). In this setting, the leader has more powerful
strategies, where she not only puts forward strategies that describe how the play-
ers move, but also gives non-negative incentives to the followers for compliance.
These incentives are then added to the overall rewards the respective follower
would receive in each move of the play, and deduced from the overall reward of
the leader. Like for leader equilibria, a strategy profile is stable if no follower
has an incentive to deviate. An incentive equilibrium is a stable strategy profile
with maximal reward for the leader.
Using incentive equilibria has various natural justifications. The techniques
we discussed here can be applied where distributed development of a system
is considered. That is, when several rational components interact among them-
selves along with a rational controller and they try to optimise their individual
objectives and specifications. Our techniques can be applied to maximise utility
of a central controller while also complying with individual component spec-
ifications. Transferring utilities is also quite natural where the payoffs on the
edges directly translate to the gains incurred by individual components. These
techniques can also be used to maximise social optima where rational controller
follow the objective of maximising joint utility. We now discuss two simple ex-
amples that exemplify the role that incentives can play to achieve good stable
solutions of multi-player mean-payoff games.
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Fig. 1. (a) Incentive equilibrium beats leader equilibrium and Nash equilibrium and
(b) Incentive equilibrium gives much better system utilisation.
Example 1. Consider the multi-player mean-payoff game shown in Figure 1(a).
Here we have three players: Player 1, Player 2 (the leader), and Player 3. The
vertex labelled 1 is controlled by Player 1, while the vertex labelled 2 is controlled
by Player 2. All other vertices are controlled by Player 3. We further annotate
the rewards of various players on the edges of the graph by giving a triple, where
the reward of the players 1, 2, and 3 are shown in that order. We omit the
labels when the rewards of all players are 0. An incentive equilibrium would
be given by (a strategy profile leading to) the play 〈1, 2, 3ω〉, where the leader
pays an incentive of 1 to Player 1 for each step and 0 to Player 3. By doing
this, she secures a payoff of 8 for herself. The reward for the players 1 and 3 in
this incentive equilibrium are each 1 and −9, respectively. A leader equilibrium
would result in the play 〈1, 2, 5ω〉 with rewards of 1 for Player 1 and the leader
and −2 for Player 3: when the leader cannot pay any incentive to Player 1, then
the move from Vertex 2 to Vertex 3 will not be part of a stable strategy. The only
Nash equilibrium in this game would result in the play 〈1, 4ω〉 with the rewards
of 1 for Player 1, 0 for the leader, and −1 for Player 3. This example shows how
leader benefits from her additional choices in leader and incentive equilibria. uunionsq
Example 2. Consider the multi-player mean-payoff game shown in the Figure 1(b)
with five players—Player 0 (or: leader) and Player 1 to 4 (followers). For i ∈
{1, 2, 3, 4}, Player i controls the vertex labelled i in the game and gets a reward
of 1 whenever token is at vertex i. (To keep the rewards on the edges, one could
encode this by giving this reward whenever vertex i is entered.) Player 0 gets
a reward of 1 in all of these vertices. The payoff of all other players is 0 in all
other cases. Notice that the only play defined by Nash or leader equilibria in this
example is 〈(1, 5, 6)ω〉, which provides a payoff of 13 to Player 0 and Player 1, and
a payoff of 0 to all other players. For incentive equilibria, however, the leader can
give an incentive of 112 to all followers when they follow the play 〈(1, 2, 3, 4)ω〉. It
is easy to see that such a strategy profile is incentive stable. The leader will then
receive a payoff of 23 , i.e., her payoff from the cycle, 1, minus the incentives given
to the other players, 4 · 112 . All other players receive a payoff of 13 , consisting
of the payoff from the cycle, 14 , plus the incentive they receive from the leader,
1
12 . Notice that this payoff is not only better from the leader’s point-of-view, the
other players are also better off in this equilibrium. uunionsq
In both examples, we saw that the incentive equilibria are strictly better
than Nash and leader equilibria. It is not a coincidence—note that leader reward
from any Nash equilibrium cannot be greater than her reward from any leader
equilibrium, as in the case of leader strategy profiles, leader can select from a
wider range of strategy profiles. Thus, if compared to a Nash equilibrium, a
leader equilibrium can only be superior w.r.t. the leader reward. Similarly, a
leader equilibrium cannot beat an incentive equilibrium, as here also, leader can
select from a wider range of strategy profiles (‘leader stable’ strategy profiles can
be viewed as an ‘incentive stable’ strategy profiles with 0 incentives). It again
implies that leader reward from any leader equilibrium cannot be greater than
her reward from any incentive equilibrium.
Related Work. Ummels and Wojtczak [27,28] considered Nash equilibria for
mean-payoff games and showed that the decision problem of finding a Nash
equilibria is NP-complete for pure (not allowing randomisation) strategy profiles,
while the problem is undecidable for arbitrary randomised strategies. Gupta and
Schewe [13] have extended these results to leader equilibria. The undecidability
result of [28] for Nash equilibria in arbitrary randomised strategies can be eas-
ily extended to leader equilibria. For this reason, we focus on non-randomised
strategies throughout this paper. Leader equilibria were introduced by von Stack-
elberg [29] and were further studied in [11]. The strategy profiles we study here
are inspired from [12] and are studied in detail for infinite games in [13]. In-
centive equilibria have recently been introduced for bi-matrix games [14], but
have, to the best of our knowledge, not been used in infinite games. Two-player
mean-payoff games were first studied in [9] and were shown to be positionally
determined. They can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time [30,6], smoothed
polynomial time [3], PPAD [10] and randomised subexponential [2] time. Their
decision problem is also known to be in UP∩co-UP [30,16].
Contributions. The key contribution of the paper is the concept of incentive
equilibria to system analysis in general and to multi-player mean-payoff games
in particular. We show that the complexity of finding incentive equilibria is same
as that for finding leader equilibria [13] for multi-player mean-payoff games: it is
NP-complete in general, but, for a fixed number of players, it is in the same com-
plexity class as solving two-player mean-payoff games (2MPGs). In other words,
solving two-player mean-payoff games is the most expensive step involved. We
have implemented an efficient version of the optimal strategy improvement algo-
rithm from [24] as a backbone, and equipped it with a logarithmic search to ex-
pand it from the qualitative evaluation (finding mean partitions) of mean-payoff
games to their quantitative evaluation. We construct incentive equilibria by im-
plementing a constraint system that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for
a strategy profile to be (1) stable and (2) provide optimal leader return among
them. The evaluation of the constraint system involves evaluating a bounded
number of calls to the linear programming solver. The contribution of the paper
is therefore two-fold—first to conceptualise incentive equilibria in multi-player
mean-payoff games (Section 2-3), and second to present a tool (Section 4) deriv-
ing optimal return for the leader by evaluating a number of multi-player games.
2 Incentive equilibrium
We introduce the concept of incentive equilibria for multi-player mean-payoff
games. These games are played among multiple players on a multi-weighted
finite directed graph arena where a distinguished player, called the leader, is
able to put forward a strategy profile. She will follow the strategy she assigned
for herself, while all other players, called her followers, will comply with the
strategy she suggested, unless they benefit from unilateral deviation. The leader
is further allowed to incentivise the behaviour of her followers by sharing her
payoff with them, in order to make compliance with the strategy she has put
forward sufficiently attractive. This, in turn, may improve the leader’s payoff.
Before we define incentive equilibria, let us recall a few key definitions.
Definition 1 (Multi-player Mean-Payoff Games). A multi-player mean-
payoff game (MMPG) arena G is a tuple (P, V, (Vp)p∈P , v0, E, (rp)p∈P ) where
– P is a finite set of players with a distinguished leader player l ∈ P ,
– V is a finite set of vertices with a distinguished initial vertex v0 ∈ V ,
– (Vp)p∈P is a partition of V characterising vertices controlled by players,
– E ⊆ V×V is a set of edges such that for all v ∈ V there is v′ ∈ V with
(v, v′)∈E, and
– (rp)p∈P is a family of reward functions rp : E → Q, that for each player
p ∈ P , assigns reward for player p associated with that edge.
A finite play pi = 〈v0, v1, . . . , vn〉 of the game G is a sequence of vertices such
that v0 is the initial vertex, and for every 0 ≤ i < n, we have, (vi, vi+1) ∈ E.
An infinite play is defined in an analogous manner. A multi-player mean-payoff
game is played on a game arena G among several players by moving a token
along the edges of the arena. The game begins by placing a token on the initial
vertex. Each time the token is on the vertex controlled by a player p ∈ P ,
the player p chooses an outgoing edge and moves the token along this edge.
The game continues in this fashion forever, and the players thus construct an
infinite play of the game. The (raw) payoff rp(pi) of a player p ∈ P associated
with a play pi = 〈v0, v1, . . .〉 is the limit average reward of the path, given as
rp(pi)
def
= lim infn→∞ 1n
∑n−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
. We refer to this value as the raw
payoff of the player p to distinguish it from the payoff for the player that also
includes the incentive given to the player by the leader.
A strategy of a player is a recipe for the player to choose the successor vertex.
It is given as a function σp : V
∗Vp → V such that σp(pi) is defined for a finite
play 〈v0, . . . , vn〉 when vn ∈ Vp and it is such that (vn, σp(pi)) ∈ E. A family of
strategies σ = (σp)p∈P is called a strategy profile. Given a strategy profile σ, we
write σ(p) for the strategy of player p ∈ P in σ. A strategy profile σ defines a
unique play piσ, and therefore a raw payoff rp(σ) = rp(piσ) for each player p. We
write ΣGp for the set of strategy of player p ∈ P and ΠG for the set of strategy
profiles in a game arena G. When the game arena is clear from the context, we
omit it from the superscript.
For a strategy profile σ, a player p ∈ P , and a strategy σ′ of p, we write
σp,σ′ for the strategy profile σ
′ such that σ′(p) = σ′ and σ′(p′) = σ(p′) for all
p′ ∈ P \ {p}. We can now define Nash and leader (aka Stackelberg) equilibria.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibria and Leader Equilibria). A strategy profile
σ is a Nash equilibrium if no player would gain from unilateral deviation, i.e.,
for all p ∈ P we have rp(σ) ≥ rp(σp,σ′) for all σ′ ∈ Σp. A strategy profile σ
is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the leader, would gain from
unilateral deviation, i.e., for all p ∈ P\ {l} we have rp(σ) ≥ rp(σp,σ′) for all
σ′ ∈ Σp. A leader equilibrium is a maximal leader strategy profile.
We next define an incentive strategy profile as a strategy profile which satisfies
the stability requirements of the leader equilibria and allows the leader to give
incentives to the followers. We refer to an optimal strategy profile in this class
that provides maximal reward to the leader as an incentive equilibrium.
An incentive to a player p is a function ιp:V
∗Vp→R≥0 from the set of histories
to incentives. Incentives can be extended to infinite play pi = 〈v0, v1, . . .〉 in
the usual mean-payoff fashion: ιp(pi)
def
= lim infn→∞ 1n
∑n−1
i=0 ιp(v0 . . . vn−1). The
overall payoff ρp(pi) to a follower in run pi is the raw payoff plus all incentives,
ρp(pi)
def
= rp(pi) + ιp(pi), while the overall payoff of the leader ρl(pi) is her raw
payoff after deducting all incentives, ρl(pi)
def
= rl(pi)−
∑
p∈Pr{l} ιp(pi).
We extend the notion of a strategy profile in the presence of incentives as
a pair (σ, ι), where σ is a strategy profile assigned by the leader, in which the
leader pays an incentive given by the incentive profile ι = (ιp)p∈Pr{l}. We write
ιp for the incentive for player p ∈ P \ {l}. We write ιp(σ) for the incentive to
player p for the unique run piσ under incentive profile ι. In any incentive strategy
profile (σ, ι), no player but the leader may benefit from deviation. An optimal
strategy profile among this class would form an incentive equilibrium.
Definition 3 (Incentive Equilibria). A strategy profile (σ, ι) is an incentive
strategy profile, if no follower can improve his overall payoff from a unilateral
deviation, i.e., for all players p ∈ Pr{l} we have that rp(σ)+ιp(σ) ≥ rp(σp,σ′)+
ιp(σp,σ′) for all σ
′ ∈ Σp. An incentive strategy profile (σ, ι) is an incentive equi-
librium if the leader’s total payoff for this profile is maximal among all incen-
tive strategy profiles, i.e., for all (σ′, ι′) we have that rl(σ) −
∑
p∈Pr{l} ιp(σ) ≥
rl(σ
′)−∑p∈Pr{l} ι′p(σ′).
An incentive strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if all incentives are 0,
and a Nash strategy profile if, in addition, σ is also a Nash equilibrium. We
write SP, ISP, LSP, and Nash SP for the set of strategy profiles, incentive strat-
egy profiles, leader strategy profiles, and Nash strategy profiles respectively. It
is clear that Nash SP ⊆ LSP ⊆ ISP ⊆ SP. This observation, together with
Example 1(a) yield the following result.
Theorem 1 (IE ≥ LE ≥ NE). Incentive equilibria do not provide smaller
return than leader equilibria, and leader equilibria do not provide smaller return
than Nash equilibria. Moreover, there are games for which the leader reward from
three equilibria are different.
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Fig. 2. Gadget reducing incentive equilibrium to leader equilibrium. Here we assume
that ` is the leader player and 1, . . . , n are n followers. Here we label a state by ` if it
is controlled by leader, and by p if it is controlled by a player p. Every state p of the
original game arena is replaced by 2n + 2 states in the gadget in the manner shown
above. Here reward vector bi corresponds to reward −h for the leader, reward +h to
follower i, and reward 0 to all other followers.
3 Existence, Construction, and Complexity
This section is dedicated to the existence, construction, and complexity of in-
centive equilibria. Similar results were developed by Gupta and Schewe [13] for
leader equilibria for multi-player mean-payoff games. If we are only interested
in complexity classes, the results in the following section can be obtained by a
simple reduction to leader equilibria [13] using a gadget (Fig. 2) that replaces
each state by intuitively circling through the followers and allowing the leader to
transfer a large part h (for high incentive) of her utility to each of the followers3.
Following this approach leads, however, to an increase in the size of the linear
programs, simply because we would incur a blow-up of the game by a factor
of 2|P |. To avoid this unnecessary blowup, we adapt the proofs from [13] that
result in a more efficient algorithm.
Proof Sketch. We first introduce a canonical class of incentive strategy profiles—
the perfectly-incentivised strategy profiles (PSPs)—that corresponds to the Stack-
elberg version of the classic subgame perfection. Keep in mind that not all
perfectly-incentivised strategy profiles (PSPs) are valid incentive strategy pro-
files (ISPs). On the other hand, we show that every ISP has a corresponding
PSP (which is also an ISP) with the same leader reward. Thanks to this result,
in order to construct incentive equilibrium it suffices to consider PSPs that are
also ISPs.
3 When translating a strategy in the presence of incentives (σ, ι), the translation can
be done by simulating the runs. The translation of the strategy profile σ is straight
forward; it determines the choices at the respective last states from the gadgets. The
translation of the incentives refer to the choices within the gadgets. They can be
obtained by letting the leader make the decision to transfer h to follower p if, and
only if, the sum of the incentives this follower p has collected in the game on the
original MMPG is at least h higher than the sum of the utilities the leader has so
far transferred to p in the gadgets. If passing through a gadget is counted as one
step, all lim inf values agree on the original and its simulation. The back translation
is even more direct: it suffices to wait till the end of each gadget, and then assign
incentives accordingly.
Further, we show that, for PSPs that are ISPs, it suffices to find a maximum
in a well behaved class of strategy profiles: strategy profiles where every edge has
a limit share of the run—by showing that the supremum of general strategies
cannot be higher than the supremum of these well behaved ones. We then show
how to construct well behaved PSPs that are ISPs based on a family of constraint
systems that depend on the occurring and recurring vertices on the play. At the
same time, we show that no general ISP that defines a play with this set of
occurring and recurrent vertices can have a higher value. The set of occurring
and recurrent vertices can be guessed and the respective constraint system can
be build and solved in polynomial time, which also provides inclusion of the
related decision problem in NP.
3.1 Perfectly-incentivised strategy profiles
We define a canonical form of an incentive equilibrium with this play that we call
perfectly-incentivised strategy profiles (PSP). In a PSP, a deviator (a deviating
follower) is punished, and the leader incentivises all other followers to collude
against the deviator. While the larger set of strategies and plays that define
them (when compared to Nash and leader equilibria) lead to a better value,
this incentive scheme leads to a higher stability: the games are subgame perfect
relative to the leader. A strategy profile (σ, ι) is a subgame perfect incentive
strategy profile, if every reachable subgame is also an incentive strategy profile.
This term adjusts the classic notion of subgame perfect equilibria to our setting.
In a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, it is required that the subgame started
on each history also forms a Nash equilibrium. Note that the leader is allowed
to benefit from deviation in our setting.
The means to obtain subgame perfection after deviation is to make all players
harm the most recent deviator. Thus, we essentially resort to a two-player game.
For a multi-player mean-payoff game G, we define, for each follower p, the two-
player mean-payoff game (2MPG) Gp where p keeps his reward function, while all
other players have the same antagonistic reward −rp. Two-player mean-payoff
games are memoryless determined, such that every vertex v has a value, which
we denote by rp(v). This value clearly defines a minimal payoff of a follower:
when he passes by a vertex in a play, then he cannot expect an outcome below
rp(v), as he would otherwise deviate.
PSP strategy profiles are in the tradition of reward and punish strategy
profiles [13]. In any ’reward and punish’ strategy profile, the leader facilitates
the power of all remaining followers to punish a deviator. If a player p chooses
to deviate from the strategy profile at history h, the game would turn into a
two-player game, where all the other followers and the leader forsake their own
interests, and jointly try to ‘punish’ p. That is, player p may still try to maximise
his reward and his objective remains exactly the same, but the rewards of the
rest of the players have changed to negative of the reward of player p. As they
form a coalition with the joint objective to harm p, this is an ordinary two-player
mean-payoff game that starts at the vertex last(h).
For a strategy profile σ and a history h, we call h a deviating history, if it is
not a prefix of piσ. We denote by dev(h, σ) the last player p, who has deviated from
his or her strategy σp on a deviating history h. A perfectly-incentivised strategy
profile is defined as a strategy profile (PSP) (σ, ι) with the following properties.
For all prefixes h and h′ of piσ and for all followers p, it holds that ιp(h) = ιp(h′).
We also refer to this value by ιp. For deviator histories h
′, the incentive ιp(h′) is 0
except for the following cases. On every deviating history h with deviating player
p = dev(h, σ), the player p′ who owns the vertex v = last(h) follows the strategy
from the 2MPG Gp. If, under this strategy, player p′ selects the successor v′ at
a vertex v in the 2MPG Gp (and thus σp′(h) = v′), p′ is a follower, and p′ 6= p,
then player p′ receives an incentive, such that rp′(v, v′) + ιp′(h · v′) = rmax + 1.
Note that, technically, the leader punishes herself in this definition. This is
only to keep definitions simple; she is allowed to have an incentive to deviate,
and the subgame perfection does not impose a criterion upon her. Note also that
a PSP is not necessarily an incentive strategy profile, as it does not guarantee
anything about piσ. The following theorem states the importance of PSPs in
constructing incentive equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Let (σ, ι) be an ISP that defines a play piσ. Then we can define a
PSP (σ, ι), that is also an ISP, with the same reward, and defines the same play.
The proof of this theorem follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Let (σ′, ι′) be a strategy profile that defines a play piσ′ , which contains
precisely the reachable vertices Q. Let (σ′, ι′) satisfy that, ∀ followers p ∈ P \{l}
and all vertices v ∈ Q∩Vp owned by p we have that ιp(σ′)+rp(σ′) ≥ rp(v). Then
we can define a PSP (σ, ι) with the same reward, which defines the same play.
Proof. We note that a PSP (σ, ι) is fully defined by the play piσ and the ι
restricted to the prefixes of piσ. We now define the PSP (σ, ι) with the following
property: piσ = piσ′ , that is the play of the PSP equals the play defined by
the ISP we started with. For all followers p and all prefixes h of piσ, we have
ιp(h) = ι
′
p(σ). It is obvious that (σ
′, ι′) and (σ, ι) yield the same reward for all
followers and the same reward for the leader. We now assume for contradiction
that the resulting PSP is not an incentive strategy profile. If this is the case,
then a follower p must benefit from deviation at some history h. Let us start
with the case that h is a deviator history. In this case, the reward for p upon
not deviating is rmax + 1, while it is the outcome of some game upon deviation,
which is clearly bounded by rmax.
We now turn to the case that h is not a deviator history, and therefore a
prefix of piσ. Let p be the owner of v = last(h). If p is the leader, we have nothing
to show. If p is a follower and does not have an incentive to deviate in (σ, ι), we
have nothing to show. If p is a follower and has an incentive to deviate in (σ, ι),
we note that his payoff after deviation would be bounded from above by rp(v).
Thus, he does not have an incentive to deviate (contradiction). uunionsq
Lemma 2. Let (σ, ι) be an ISP that defines a play piσ, which contains precisely
the vertices Q. Then, for all followers p ∈ P \ {l} and all vertices v ∈ Q ∩ Vp
owned by p, we have that ιp(σ
′) + rp(σ′) ≥ rp(v).
Proof. Assume that this is not the case for a follower p and a vertex v ∈ Q
owned by p. Then p would benefit upon deviating when visiting v. uunionsq
3.2 Existence and construction of incentive equilibria
We say that a strategy profile σ is well-behaved if in the resulting play piσ,
the frequency (ratio) of occurrence of every edge of the game arena occurs has
a limit, i.e, each edge here occurs with a limit probability (the limes inferior
and superior of the share of its occurrence on piσ are equal). Such notion of
well-behaved strategy profiles were also defined in [13] for the case of leader
equilibria. We first construct optimal ISPs among well behaved PSPs, and then
show that no ISP give a better payoff for leader.
Let σ is a well-behaved perfectly-incentivised strategy profile and let Q be
the set of vertices visited in piσ and S ⊆ Q be the set of vertices that are visited
infinitely often (note that S is strongly connected). Let p(s,t) be the limit ratio
(frequency) of occurrence of an edge (s, t) ∈ E ∩ S × S in piσ and let pv be the
limit ratio of each vertex v ∈ S.
Thanks to the proof of Lemma 1, the following constraint system (linear pro-
gram) characterises the necessary and sufficient conditions for the well-behaved
perfectly-incentivised strategy profile σ to be an ISP.
1. pv = 0 if v ∈ V r S and pv ≥ 0 if v ∈ S.
2. pe = 0 if e ∈ E r S × S and pe ≥ 0 if e ∈ E ∩ S × S
3.
∑
v∈V pv = 1
4. ps =
∑
(s,t)∈E p(s,t) for all s ∈ S and pt =
∑
(s,t)∈E p(s,t) for all t ∈ S
5. ιp +
∑
e∈E perp(e) ≥ maxv∈Q(rp(v)) where rp(v) is the value at vertex v in
the 2MPG Gp characterising minimum payoff expected by player p.
The constraints presented above are quite self-explanatory. Constraints 1
and 2 state that the limit ratio of occurrence of a vertex and edge is positive
only when it is visited infinitely often. Constraint 3 expresses that the sum of
ratio of occurrence of vertices is equal to 1, while constraint 4 expresses the
fact the limit ratio of a vertex should be equal to limit ratios of all incoming
edges, and equal to limit ratio of all outgoing edges from that vertex. The last
constraint stems from the proof of Lemma 1 combined with the observation that
reward rp(σ) of a player p in σ is simply
∑
e∈E perp(e), that is, it is the weighted
sum of the raw rewards of the individual edges. Before we define the objective
function, we state a simple corollary from the proof of Lemma 1.
Corollary 1. Every well behaved PSP that is an ISP satisfies these constraints,
and every well behaved strategy profile (σ, ι), whose play piσ satisfies these con-
straints, defines a PSP, which is then an ISP.
Note that the resulting PSP is an ISP even if (σ, ι) is not. This is because the
satisfaction of the constraints are enough for the final contradiction in the proof
of Lemma 1.
Construction of incentive equilibria. The objective of the leader is obviously to
maximise rl(σ)−
∑
p∈Pr{l} ιp =
∑
e∈E perl(e)−
∑
p∈Pr{l} ιp. Once we have this
linear programming problem, it is simple to determine a solution in polynomial
time [17,18]. We first observe that it is standard to construct a play defining a
PSP from a solution. A key observation is that, if the linear program detailed
above for sets Q of reachable vertices and S of vertices visited infinitely often
has a solution, then there is a well behaved reward and punish strategy profile
that meets this solution.
Theorem 3. Non-well behaved PSPs that are also ISPs cannot provide better
rewards for the leader than those from well behaved PSPs that are also ISPs.
Proof. Corollary 1 shows that there exists a well defined constraint system
obeyed by all well behaved PSPs that are also ISPs with a set Q of reach-
able vertices and a set S of recurrent vertices. Let us assume for contradiction
that there is a reward and punish strategy profile (σ, ι) that defines a play piσ
with the same sets Q and S of reachable and recurrent vertices, respectively,
that provides a strictly better reward rl(σ) −
∑
p∈Pr{l} ιp, which exceeds the
maximal reward obtained by the leader in well behaved PSPs that are also ISPs
by some ε > 0.
We now construct a well behaved PSPs that are also ISPs and that also
provides a better return. First, we take a ι′ with ιp = ι′p for all followers p. This
allows us to focus on the raw rewards only. Let k be some position in piσ such
that, for all i ≥ k, only positions in the infinity set S of piσ occur. Let pi be
the tail vkvk+1vk+2 . . . of piσ that starts in position k. Obviously rp(pi) = rp(σ)
holds for all players p ∈ P . We observe that, for all δ > 0, there is an l ∈ N
such that, for all m ≥ l, 1m
∑m−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi)− δ holds for all p ∈ P ,
as otherwise the limes inferior property would be violated. We now fix, for all
a ∈ N, a sequence pia = vkvk+1vk+2 . . . vk+ma , such that vk+ma+1 = vk and
1
m
∑ma−1
i=0 rp
(
(vi, vi+1)
)
> rp(pi)− 1a holds for all p ∈ P . Let pi0 = v0v1 . . . vk−1.
We now select pi′ = pi0pi1b1pi2b2pi3b3 . . ., where the bi are natural numbers big
enough to guarantee that bi·|pii||pii+1|+|pi0|+
∑i
j=1 bj ·|pij |
≥ 1 − 1i holds. Letting bi grow
this fast ensures that the payoff, which is at least rp(pi)− 1i for all players p ∈ P ,
dominates till the end of the first iteration4 of |pii+1|. The resulting play belongs
to a well behaved (as the limit exists) strategy profile, and can thus be obtained
by a well behaved PSP by Corollary 1. It thus provides a solution to the linear
program from above, which contradicts our assumption. uunionsq
Consequently, it suffices to guess the optimal sets Q of vertices that occur
and S of vertices that occur infinitely often to obtain a constraint system that
describes an incentive equilibrium, which is well behaved and a PSP—and there-
fore subgame perfect.
4 Including the first iteration of pii+1 is a technical necessity, as a complete iteration
of pii+i provides better guarantees, but without the inclusion of this guarantee, the
pij ’s might grow too fast, preventing the existence of a limes.
Corollary 2. The decision problems ‘is there a (subgame perfect) incentive equi-
librium with leader reward ≥ r’ is in NP, and the answer to these two questions
is the same.
Note that, if we have a fixed number of players, the number of possible
constraint systems is polynomial. Like in [13], there are only polynomially many
(for n vertices and k followers O(nk) many) second parts (the constraints on the
follower rewards) of the constraint systems. For them, it suffices to consider the
most liberal sets Q (which is unique) and S (the SCCs in the game restricted
to Q, at most n). For a fixed number of players, finding incentive equilibria is
therefore in the same class as solving 2MPGs. We adapt the NP hardness proof
for leader equilibrium in mean-payoff games from [13] by reducing the 3SAT
satisfiability formula over n atomic propositions with m conjuncts to solve a
MMPG with 2n+ 1 players and 5m+ 4n+ 2 vertices with payoffs 0 and 1 only.
Theorem 4. The problem of deciding whether an incentive equilibrium σ with
reward rl(σ) ≥ 1 − 1/n of the leader exists in games with rewards in {0, 1}, is
NP-complete.
4 Experimental results
We have implemented a tool [1] in C++ to evaluate the performance of the
proposed algorithms for multi-player mean-payoff games (MMPG) for a small
number of players. We implemented an algorithm from [24] to find mean values
at the vertices. We then infer and solve a number of constraint systems. We
describe our main algorithm here.
4.1 Algorithm specific details
We first evaluate MMPGs using reduction to solving underlying 2MPGs. We
then infer and solve a number of linear programming problems to find a solution.
For few number of players, the number of different solutions to these games is
usually small, and, consequently, the number of linear programming problems
to solve is small, too. In order to find the individual mean partition, we use an
algorithm from [24], that finds 0-mean partitions, and expand it quantitatively
to find the value of 2MPGs. We recall that for 2MPG both players have optimal
memoryless strategies. Under such strategies, the game will follow a ‘lasso path’
from every starting vertex: a finite (and possibly empty) path, followed by a
cycle, which is repeated infinitely many times. The value of a game position is
defined by the average of the edge weights on this cycle.
In our context, the edge weights are either 0 or 1. The values of the vertices
are therefore fractions al with 0 ≤ a ≤ l ≤ n, where l is the length of the cycle,
and a is the number of ‘accepting’ events in the DBA that refers to the objective
of the respective player, i.e., the edges with value 1, occurring on this cycle.
An α-mean partition of a 2MPG is the subset of vertices, for which the return
is ≥ α. Conceptually, to find the al -mean partition, one would simply subtract al
from the weight of every edge and look for the 0-mean partition. However, to stay
with integers, it is better to use integer values on the edges, e.g., by replacing
the 0s by −a, and the 1s by l − a. For games with n vertices, there are only
O(n2) values for the fraction al to consider, as optimal memoryless strategies
always lead to lasso paths and only the cycle at the end of the lasso determines
the values for a and l, where 0 < a < l ≤ n.
We start by narrowing down the set of values by classifying the mean partition
in a logarithmic search. After determining the 12 mean partition, we know which
values are < 0.5 and ≥ 0.5, respectively. The two parts of the game can then be
analysed further, determining the 14 and
3
4 mean partition, respectively. After s
such partitionings, all values in a partition of the game are either known to be in
an [k ·2−s, (k+1) ·2−s[ interval for some k < 2s−1, or in the interval [1−2−s, 1].
We stop to bisect when the size p of a partition is at most 2s. In this case, the
respective interval has f ≤ p fractions with a denominator ≤ p. We determine
them, store them in a balanced tree, and use it to determine the correct value
of all vertices of the partition in dlog2 fe steps.
The number of different values of nodes in a 2MPG is usually small, and
certainly it would be much smaller than the number of vertices in the game.
Consequently, the number of constraint systems is also small for a small number
of players. We use this algorithm to evaluate a number of randomly created
three player mean-payoff games, where the player take turns. We consider three
players – player 1, player 2 and a leader and two different evaluations on the same
game graph. We first see how each player fares when they try to maximise their
return against a coalition of all other players, including the leader. In the first
evaluation, leader forms a coalition with player 1 (minimiser) against player 2
(maximiser) on the payoffs defined for player 2. We find the different possible
mean values at the nodes in this evaluation, using the algorithm from above. In
the second evaluation, leader forms a coalition with player 2 (minimiser) against
player 1 (maximiser) on the payoffs defined for player 1. We also note the different
possible mean values at the nodes in this evaluation, using again the algorithm
from above. The resultant two-player games provide the constraints for the linear
programming problems that we presented in Section 3.2. These different values
form the different thresholds that we have to consider. We now consider all
possible combinations of these different threshold values for the followers and
determine the vertices that comply with them.
4.2 Experimental results
Experiments indicate that our implementation of the algorithm can solve exam-
ples of size 100 nodes and 10 players within 30 minutes. The algorithm is, of
course, much faster for the games with two or three players. Figures 3 and 4
show the experimental results for the following two problem classes.
– Recall the example from Figure 1(b). We generalise this example for token
ring graph parameterised by 2 variables, n and d. It has ’n’ nodes on the inner
cycle, each of which correspond to ’n’ different players and each of these ’n’
Fig. 3. The figure shows results for a generalisation of example 2 for multiple players
with n nodes in the inner cycle and n−1 in outer cycles where n is number of players.
nodes is also present on another cycle of length ’d’. The weights are set such
that, all players except the leader get ’1/n’ if they chose the inner ring and
get ’1/d’ if they chose their respective outer ring. The leader reward is ’1’ in
the inner ring and ’1/d’ in all the other rings. The data supports the pen-
and-paper analysis that incentives are useful iff n > d > n(n − 1)/(2n − 1)
holds. Figure 3 shows the leader reward for this example and the running
time of our tool to compute it.
– Figure 4 (left plot) shows the difference between incentive equilibrium and
leader equilibrium for randomly generated 3 player MMPGs, while the right
plot shows similar results on random graphs, where the number of players
range from 3 to 10.
The evaluation results confirm that the leader reward increases significantly in
incentive equilibria when compared to leader equilibria.
5 Discussion
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of incentive equilibria
in multi-player mean-payoff games and the implementation of our techniques
in a tool. We study how a rational leader might improve over her outcome by
paying small incentives to her followers. At first, it may not seem to be a rational
move of the leader, but close insight would show how a leader might improve
her reward in this way. The incentive equilibria are seen as an extension to
Fig. 4. The left figure shows the results for randomly generated MMPGs with 3
players, while the right one is for randomly generated MMPGs with 3 to 10 players.
leader equilibria, where a rational leader, by giving an incentive to every other
player in the game, can derive an optimal strategy profile. We believe that these
techniques are helpful for the leader when maximising the return for a single
player and would also be instrumental in defining stable rules and optimising
various outcomes. The evaluation results from Section 4 show that the results
are significantly better for the leader in an incentive equilibrium as compared to
her return in a leader equilibrium.
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